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Abstract
This article is part of a Symposium that provides a forum for comparing legal herme-
neutics as articulated by four scholars from the United States and four scholars from 
Brazil. The article embraces this cross-cultural event by asking whether American legal 
hermeneutics is “ugly” and is practiced by “ugly Americans.” The pejorative cast of this 
terminology is obvious and intentional, but it is also ambiguous and multi-layered. The 
Essay unfolds various dimensions of ugly American hermeneutics and suggests that - 
ugly though they may be -American scholars still can make some important contribu-
tions to the worldwide conversation regarding legal hermeneutics.  It is their plain-faced 
pragmatism, perhaps, that is the source of our contribution even as it casts them (some-
times unfairly) as the ugly Americans. The Article discusses the political spectacle of 
appointment of new Supreme Court Justices, and the reductive efforts of some Justices 
to reduce judgment to simplistic history by means of the theory of “new originalism.”
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Resumo
Este artigo é parte de um Simpósio que fornece um fórum para comparar a hermenêutica 
jurídica articulada por quatro estudiosos dos Estados Unidos e quatro estudiosos do 
Brasil. O artigo abarca este evento intercultural perguntando se a hermenêutica jurídica 
americana é “feia” e praticada por “americanos feios”. O matiz pejorativo desta terminologia 
é obvio e intencional, mas também é ambíguo e com várias camadas. O trabalho desdobra 
várias dimensões da hermenêutica americana feia e sugere que – embora possam ser 
feios – os estudiosos americanos ainda podem dar algumas importantes contribuições 
para a conversação mundial sobre hermenêutica jurídica. É o seu pragmatismo simples 
ou comum, talvez, que é a fonte de nossa contribuição mesmo que os faça parecer (às 
vezes injustamente) como os americanos feios. O Artigo discute o espetáculo político de 
nomeação de novos juízes da Suprema Corte, e os esforços redutivos de alguns deles para 
reduzir o julgamento à história simplista, por meio da teoria do “novo originalismo.”
Palavras-chave: hermenêutica, Estados Unidos, Brasil, América, justiça.
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Introduction
The 1958 best-selling novel, The Ugly American 
(Lederer and Burdick, 1958) gave rise to a common 
epithet that gained renewed currency during the ad-
ministration of President George W. Bush. The novel 
depicts American diplomats and ofﬁ cials in a series of 
short vignettes principally set in the ﬁ ctional country 
of Sarkhan. Most of the Americans are loud, arrogant, 
ignorant, racist, and cloistered. They fail to understand 
that the communists are able to gain traction in South-
east Asia because they don’t despise the local people 
and their culture. The ugliness of these Americans is a 
serious matter that has profound consequences, but 
there are some heroes. Ironically, the “ugly American” in 
the story of the same name is a plain-looking man who 
doesn’t fall into the behavioral trap that snares the best 
and the brightest of America’s diplomatic corps. He is a 
humble and diligent worker who is accomplishing more 
than all the tuxedoed charge d’affaires combined.
The epithet “ugly American” has morphed into a 
more general caricature of American tourists, who re-
portedly arrive at a foreign destination and demand that 
others speak English and attend to their needs, all the 
while making a loud and garish spectacle of themselves. 
The ugliness in this iteration of the phrase is more cul-
tural and aesthetic, less political and social. Although 
aesthetics cannot be divorced wholly from social and 
political considerations, this valence of ugliness is differ-
ent. It is abrasive and strange rather than wrongheaded 
and offensive. Despite their frustration with invading 
tourists from America, I expect that many foreigners 
ﬁ nd these same characteristics more palatable when 
they visit the United States. The same behavior is ex-
perienced as open and authentic when it occurs within 
the American context. The brashness and directness of 
New Yorkers, the friendliness of Midwesterners, and the 
libertarian attitude of Westerners all have a certain va-
lidity until these various Americans are uprooted and let 
loose in Paris or São Paulo.
This Symposium provides a forum for comparing 
legal hermeneutics as articulated by scholars from the 
United States and Brazil. I want to embrace this cross-
cultural event by asking whether American legal herme-
neutics is “ugly” and is practiced by “ugly Americans.” 
The pejorative cast of this terminology is obvious and 
intentional, but it is also ambiguous and multi-layered. 
In this Essay I unfold these various dimensions of ugly 
American hermeneutics and suggest that—ugly though 
we may be—American scholars still can make some 
important contributions to the worldwide conversa-
tion regarding legal hermeneutics. It is our plain-faced 
pragmatism, perhaps, that is the source of our contribu-
tion even as it casts us (sometimes unfairly) as the ugly 
Americans.
Ugly to the bone: the failure of 
hermeneutical theory in American 
legal thought
American legal hermeneutics isn’t just homely, it 
is ugly. Downright ugly. Butt ugly. Ugly to the bone. The 
desuetude of American hermeneutics is highlighted in 
high-deﬁ nition technicolor every time the United States 
Senate undertakes to conﬁ rm a new Justice to the 
Supreme Court. In the recent hearings leading to the 
conﬁ rmation of Justice Sotomayor we had to endure 
innumerable idiocies as some Senators seized upon var-
ious statements by Judge Sotomayor regarding how her 
background as a poor, working class Latina might have 
informed her work as an appellate judge.
Senator Jeff Sessions, the ranking Republican on 
the Senate Judiciary Committee and himself a failed nom-
inee to the federal bench (Rucker, 2009) suggested that 
judges may follow one of two paths, with the fate of the 
country riding on the choice that is made. To describe the 
dire situation he perceived, Sessions relied on the famil-
iar binary of objective ﬁ delity to pre-established law as 
contrasted with the subjective creation of rules under 
the guise of judging. This rhetorical framing responded to 
President Obama’s statement that he would seek a nomi-
nee who displayed empathy, which conservative oppo-
nents were quick to equate with lawless favoritism. In his 
opening statement, Senator Sessions opined ominously 
that the “legal system is at a dangerous crossroads” of 
two very different visions of judging.
Down one path is the traditional American legal sys-
tem, so admired around the world, where judges im-
partially apply the law to the facts without regard to 
personal views.
This is the compassionate system because this is the 
fair system. In the American legal system, courts do 
not make the law or set policy, because allowing une-
lected ofﬁ cials to make law would strike at the heart 
of our democracy. [...]
Indeed, our legal system is based on a ﬁ rm belief in an 
ordered universe and objective truth. The trial is the 
process by which the impartial and wise judge guides 
us to the truth.
Down the other path lies a Brave New World where 
words have no true meaning and judges are free to 
decide what facts they choose to see. In this world, 
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a judge is free to push his or her own political or so-
cial agenda. I reject this view, and Americans reject 
that view (Conﬁ rmation Hearing on the Nomination 
of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor to Be an Associate Justice 
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
5-6 (2009) (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions, member, S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary).
Senator Sessions’s courage in rejecting the latter 
path is more than a bit undermined by the fact that no 
serious person has ever endorsed such a conception of 
language, law, and judging.
Senator Chuck Grassley also spoke directly to 
the problem of having judges display “empathy” as they 
adjudicate cases.
President Obama said that he would nominate jud-
ges based on their ability to empathize in general 
and with certain groups in particular. This empathy 
standard is troubling to me. In fact, I am concerned 
that judging based on empathy is really just legislating 
from the bench.
The Constitution requires that judges be free from 
personal politics, feelings, and preferences. Presi-
dent Obama’s empathy standard appears to encou-
rage judges to make use of their personal politics, 
feelings, and preferences. This is contrary to what 
most of us understand to be the role of the judi-
ciary (Conﬁ rmation Hearing, 2009, p. 17-18 (state-
ment of Sen. Charles E. Grassley, member, S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary; Conﬁ rmation Hearing, 2009, 
p. 1344, statement of Judge Sonia Sotomayor, Supre-
me Court nominee).
The most embarrassing part of the spectacle, 
though, occurs when the nominee kowtows to this ab-
surd conception of judging and reafﬁ rms that she will 
judge in accordance with the law, as if the law can be 
determined and understood before the adjudicative act. 
Judge Sotomayor was less the automaton than most, but 
she quickly established her bona ﬁ des in the heart of 
her opening statement.
In the past month, many Senators have asked me about 
my judicial philosophy. It is simple: ﬁ delity to the law. 
The task of a judge is not to make the law – it is to 
apply the law. And it is clear, I believe, that my record 
in two courts reﬂ ects my rigorous commitment to 
interpreting the Constitution according to its terms; 
interpreting statutes according to their terms and 
Congress’s intent; and hewing faithfully to precedents 
established by the Supreme Court and my Circuit 
Court. In each case I have heard, I have applied the 
law to the facts at hand (Conﬁ rmation Hearing, 2009, 
p. 1344, statement of Judge Sonia Sotomayor, Supreme 
Court nominee).
At moments like these, one can only echo Colo-
nel Kurtz: “The horror! The horror!” (Coppola, 1979, 
Apocalypse Now).
This is ugly American legal hermeneutics at its 
most base, of course, as it occurs in a staged political fo-
rum where the substance of the slogans tossed around 
by the participants is less important than their symbolic 
resonance. I begin with the profane image of conﬁ rma-
tion proceedings, though, because it calls forth the fan-
tasies that gird the American legal system. Like a dream 
elicited on the psychoanalyst’s couch, the conﬁ rmation 
hearings reveal the psychology that claims to justify 
much of everyday practice, even if most sophisticated 
participants—removed from the glare of the television 
cameras and lights—would admit that such fantastic ac-
counts lack any descriptive integrity.
The core of the fantasy underlying American le-
gal practice is the claimed ability to separate “the law” 
from “the application of law in practice.” The law is abid-
ing, certain, and pre-determined through democratic 
processes. The application of law in particular cases is 
rigorously attendant to the law such that, even if the 
application is not wholly deductive in character, it is still 
highly constrained by the law. This fantasy is often equat-
ed with the ideal of the “rule of law,” and so preserving 
this legal imaginary becomes a matter of utmost impor-
tance in preserving the legitimacy of the legal system. 
By repeating the fantasy and holding the United States 
up to the world as an exemplary legal community pre-
cisely because we embrace this fantasy, American legal 
hermeneutics generates puzzlement among legal schol-
ars schooled in the continental tradition.  American le-
gal hermeneutics is ugly because it is a loud and garish 
proclamation of American exceptionalism, paired with 
an anti-intellectualism that seeks to insulate our fan-
tastic legal imaginary from serious inquiry, never mind 
rigorous critique.
A recent manifestation of the fantasy in action 
emerged in District of Columbia v. Heller. No. 07-290 (U.S. 
June 26, 2008). In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia casts 
his anchor for the stable, unchanging bedrock of histori-
cal truth to weather the storm of social change with-
out compromising the rule of law. Scalia is a proponent 
of “new textualism” (Strauss, 1998) — an ironic name 
to be sure, because his academic and judicial philoso-
phies are reactions to the perceived limitations of legal 
texts, standing alone, to secure the rule of law. After the 
linguistic-hermeneutic turn in legal theory, no serious 
commentator can suggest that words in legal texts can 
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2 Rejecting traditional references to “intent” or “purpose,” Justice Scalia has endorsed a new textualist approach to reorient statutory interpretation. He agrees that 
statutes must be read within their legal context and rejects the idea that judges can refer simply to a literal reading of the speciﬁ c language of a statute, but his focus is 
the narrow question of the ordinary meaning of the words used at the time of the enactment. He recoils from the general practice of looking to the legislative history 
to discern the subjective intentions of the drafters and the purpose of the statute in question, arguing that these open-ended and unreliable concepts permit judges 
too much leeway in deciding cases, and—even if these concepts are constraining—are not democratically and constitutionally validated. The following analysis of the 
case gives the example. A classic example of his approach can be seen in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989), in which the Court considered a rule 
of evidence that permitted the introduction of a witness’ criminal convictions so long as the probative value outweighed any prejudice to the “defendant.” The case 
involved a civil plaintiff who was injured while on work release, and the court below held that the prejudicial effect of introducing evidence of his criminal history was 
irrelevant because he was a plaintiff in the case (Green, 1989, p. 506-507). Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens engaged in a lengthy and detailed reconstruction of the 
drafting history of the rule to determine that Congress was attempting to protect criminal defendants from prejudice (Green, 1989, p. 509-524). Justice Scalia concurred, 
but chastised the majority for its inquiry (Green, 1989, p. 527-528). Scalia argued that the court should consider extra-textual materials only to conﬁ rm that the literal 
reading of the rule was absurd, and then interpret the text by doing the least violence to it (Green, 1989). He insisted that the Court focus ﬁ rst on the words of the 
text as ordinarily understood, and only if that objective meaning leads to an absurdity should the Court engage in the benign ﬁ ction that the statute should be read 
to cohere with related areas of law (Green, 1989). For additional discussion of the context of statutory interpretation, see infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
3 Justice Scalia criticizes those who would treat statutes differently from the Constitution, stating: “What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a 
statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended” (Scalia, 1997, p. 38).
4 Justice Scalia once notoriously used a Sicilian hand gesture that might be considered a stronger version of thumbing one’s nose, and so my stylistic ﬂ ourish is not 
altogether fanciful. See Lattman (s.d.), Justice Scalia’s Gesture: Obscene or Not?
have plain meanings that can be applied to a given case 
unproblematically. New textualism attempts to restore 
the integrity of the legal text by conceding the obvious 
contextual and historical nature of meaning before im-
mediately trying to isolate the text in a given historical 
moment—the time of its enactment as law—to ensure 
that there can be a determinate meaning that persists 
into the future. Disregarding the equally problematic 
debates among historians about the nature of histori-
cal knowledge, the hermeneutics of doing history, and 
even the contested nature of historical datum, the new 
textualists ﬁ nd salvation in the belief that a legal text 
acquires determinant meaning by situating it in the his-
torical context of its enactment.
Statutory law might fairly be conceived in simple 
communicative terms: the enacted law represents the 
work of elected representatives, and democratic le-
gitimacy requires that judges follow this original mean-
ing. Given the relative ease and frequency of amending 
statutes to adjust to changing circumstances, one might 
admit the theoretical desirability—without, of course, 
conceding the practical capability—of limiting the mean-
ing of statutory text to the objective, public meaning of 
the text at the time of its enactment. And Justice Scalia 
has strenuously made just this argument for years.2
But even if one believes that legislation is a dem-
ocrati cally-sanctioned communication of a rule that 
must be followed, the Constitution presents a differ-
ent case. As the constituting document of the polity, it 
gestures toward timeless and enduring principles that 
can provide stability to society over time. A constitution 
that requires constant emendation to deal with changes 
in society would not constitute a polity as much as it 
would serve as a super-statute.3 On the other hand, a 
written constitution must do more t han serve as an in-
vitation for judges to rule as they deem best under pres-
ent circumstances.
Various interpretive approaches to the Constitu-
tion during the past forty years reﬂ ect its status as a 
founding document for the polity. John Hart Ely famous-
ly argued that the Constitution should be interpreted to 
reinforce democratic responsiveness (Ely, 1980, 1978), 
Ronald Dworkin contended that moral reasoning is 
at the root of constitutional interpretation, (Dworkin, 
1996) and Randy Barnett sought the “lost constitution” 
that instituted libertarian rights and limited government 
(Barnett, 2004, 1998). However, experience has shown 
that the complexity and diversity of constitutional litiga-
tion makes it difﬁ cult enough for courts to articulate a 
uniﬁ ed approach to the First Amendment, not to men-
tion an overriding interpretive approach to the Con-
stitution. The encrustation of precedent appears to be 
relatively resilient against the contemporary quest for a 
uniﬁ ed theory of interpretation that produces a meth-
od or approach that renders decisions more predict-
able and legitimate. This was shown most dramatically 
when the Court refused to overturn Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973), in the interest of doctrinal purity. The 
Court cited the need to respect the settled expecta-
tions engendered by precedents and acknowledged that 
constitutional interpretation requires reasoned judg-
ment rather than recovery of a ﬁ xed and unchanging 
meaning (Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 854-55 [1992]).
Justice Scalia’s remarkable opinion in Heller 
thumbs its nose4 at these mediative efforts by the Court 
to operate withi n a plurality of theoretical justiﬁ cations 
for its practice. In Heller, the Court openly confronted 
the question of the interpretive principles that guide ad-
judication of constitutional rights because it was faced 
Mootz III  | Ugly American hermeneutics
46 Revista de Estudos Constitucionais, Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito (RECHTD), 3(1):42-55
with a rare case involving an Amendment that it had 
yet to interpret extensively. Deciding by a 5-4 vote that 
a District of Columbia law effectively banning private 
ownership of handguns violated the Second Amend-
ment, the Court held that the Amendment protected 
an individual’s right to own handguns for the purpose of 
self-defense. The opinions in the case illustrate a sharp 
contrast between applying Scalia’s new textualist meth-
odology to the Constitution and more traditional inqui-
ries into precedent, purpose and policy.
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion provides the 
Court’s ﬁ rst thoroughly new textualist reading of the 
Constitution. He begins with the central new textualist 
belief—that meaning precedes application in a speciﬁ c 
case—by spending more than ﬁ fty pages analyzing the 
“meaning of the Second Amendment” before turning 
“ﬁ nally to the law at issue here” (District of Columbia v. 
Heller, No. 07-290, slip op. at 2, 56 [U.S. June 26, 2008]). 
Needless to emphasize, he uses a rhetorical device 
rather than provide a phenomenology of his decision-
making. The entire historical discussion is oriented to 
the conclusion that ownership of a weapon to protect 
one’s home was understood to be within the protec-
tions of the Amendment at the time of its adoption. 
Consequently, it would be utterly fantastic to assume 
that Justice Scalia would have written these same ﬁ fty 
pages describing the original meaning of the Amend-
ment if he had no idea of the nature of the dispute be-
fore the Court! And if he would have done so, it renders 
the ban on advisory opinions as to the meaning of con-
stitutional provisions utterly incomprehensible. But let 
us ﬁ rst trace the manner in which Scalia weaves what 
ultimately proves to be a ﬂ imsy tapestry.
Combing the historical record to determine 
how the public would have understood the famously 
ungrammatical and ambiguous Amendment5 at the time 
of its adoption, Scalia concludes that the A mendment 
means that individual citizens have a right to possess 
handguns for their personal defense (Heller, slip op. p. 
8-16, 64). His opinion breaks down the single sentence 
of the Amendment to its constituent clauses, which he 
then deﬁ nes by reference to dictionaries from the pe-
riod. The Court struck down the District of Columbia’s 
gun control legislation for violating a constitutional right, 
but the Court acknowledged that the rampant urban 
violence in Washington, D.C. might lead some to believe 
that a right to own guns is anachronistic. Nevertheless, 
Justice Scalia wrote, “it is not the role of this Court to 
pronounce the Second Amendment extinct” (Heller, slip 
op., p. 64).
The contradictions raised by Scalia’s attempt to 
provide a genuinely new textualist interpretation of the 
original meaning of the Second Amendment are immedi-
ately obvious. He begins by ignoring the prefatory clause 
regarding the Militia until after he determines the meaning 
of what he construes to be the operative clause, yet he 
provides no objective grammatical or historical justiﬁ ca-
tion for this approach.6 He rejects the arguments of pro-
fessional linguists expre ssed in an amicus brief even as he 
assumes that there can be a truth of the matter regarding 
historical research (Heller, slip op., p. 15-16 [majority opin-
ion]).  And it is only after determining the original meaning 
of the Amendment that Scalia asks whether any precedents 
foreclose the application of this meaning (Heller, slip op., 
p. 47). This suggests that stare decisis might trump the 
original meaning to some extent, presumably for prag-
matic and institutional reasons (Heller, slip op., p. 47). He 
acknowledges that the right to gun ownership is not 
unlimited, and that there will be exceptions to restrict 
ownership by persons who are mentally ill or convicted 
felons and possession of handguns in government ofﬁ ces 
or schools. But again, the historical record provides no 
justiﬁ cation for these potential exceptions that Scalia ca-
sually tosses off in dicta.7
As one would expect, the early case law interpret-
ing Heller already is drifting away from the perceived solid 
ground of an original understanding of the Amendment.8 
It  takes little effort to see the cracks in Scalia’s effort to 
hew to the original public meaning of the Amendment 
and nothing more, even if one grants that determining the 
5 The Second Amendment provides, in full: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 
not be infringed” (U.S. Const. amend. II).
6 Heller, slip op., p. 3-22. Justice Stevens chides the majority for taking this approach, arguing that it is a legitimate move for an advocate, but not for a judge (Heller, slip op., p. 
8-9, Stevens, J., dissenting).
7 See Heller, slip op., p. 54-55. Justice Scalia suggests that “there will be time enough to expound upon the historical justiﬁ cations for the exceptions we have mentioned 
if and when those exceptions come before us” (Heller, slip op., p. 63), but it is curious how he came up with this admittedly incomplete list in textualist fashion if he 
had not already consulted historical sources. It is patently clear that history is the crutch, rather than the leg, upon which Scalia’s reasoning must stand. See, e.g., United 
States v. Gieswein, 346 Fed. App’x 293, 296 n.2 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We share the concern... that the Heller dictum [regarding the ability of states to preclude gun owner-
ship by felons] may be in tension with the basis for its own holding, as felon dispossession laws may not have the longstanding historical basis ascribed to them by the 
Court. [United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047-48 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring).] The McCane concurrence further worries that Heller’s dictum will 
stunt the development of Second Amendment jurisprudence in the lower courts. Id., p. 1049-1050.”). 
8 See, e.g., United States v. Knight, 574 F. Supp. 2d 224 (D. Me. 2008) (upholding statutory prohibition on the possession of ﬁ rearms by a person under a restraining 
order regarding domestic violence).  A prominent judge on the conservative Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has chastised Justice Scalia’s opinion for its activist 
character, going so far as to proclaim that Heller is guilty of the same sins as Roe v. Wade (Wilkinson, 2009). 
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original public meaning is justiﬁ ed as a matter of legal and 
political theory. In the context of deciding Heller as a case 
of (almost) ﬁ rst impression, the fantasy might be indulged. 
But in the day-to-day grind of judging, there is no time to 
engage in the luxury of phantasm. “Good for you, Justice 
Scalia,” the District Court judges might be heard saying, 
“but we have a docket to clear and no time to write 
(which is to say, create) history.”9
Let us turn to the dissenting opinions, which can 
be faulted most for the degree to which they defer to 
the historical fantasy espoused by Justice Scalia. Justice 
Stevens dissented based on an interpretation of the 
Amendment that was grounded in its text, the history 
of its enactment, and the United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 
174, 178 (1939), precedent that permitted the ban on 
sawed-off shotguns because owning a sawed-off shot-
gun lacked any nexus with militia service (Heller, slip op., 
p. 42-43 [Stevens, J., dissenting] [discussing Miller]). His 
dissent centers on a historical understanding that the 
purpose of the Amendment was to ensure that the new 
federal government could not oppress the states by 
regulating ownership of weapons by able-bodied white 
males, who comprised each state’s militia (Heller, slip op., 
p. 17-41 [Stevens, J., dissenting]). In other words, Justice 
Stevens makes an argument that combines originalism 
and purposivism, claiming that the “proper allocation 
of military power in the new Nation was an issue of 
central concern for the Framers” that led to the enact-
ment of the Amendment (Heller, slip op., p. 17, [Stevens, 
J., dissenting]). Although shaped by Scalia’s historical 
tack, Stevens’s dissent operates at a higher level of his-
torical generality. Rather than determine how individual 
words and phrases would have been understood at 
the time of enactment, Stevens inquires into the 
original understanding of the purpose of the Amend-
ment.
In contrast, Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion 
more openly criticizes the new textualist methodology 
and the lack of deﬁ nitive evidence for Justice Scalia’s 
claim that self-defense is a core value of the Amend-
ment. Breyer’s analysis leads him to conclude that the 
new originalist project is bankrupt, even as it triumphs 
(by one vote) as the chosen methodology for resolving 
the case before the Court. He writes:
At the same time the majority ignores a more im-
portant question: Given the purposes for which the 
Framers enacted the Second Amendment, how should 
it be applied to modern-day circumstances that they 
could not have anticipated? Assume, for argument’s 
sake, that the Framers did intend the Amendment to 
offer a degree of self-defense protection. Does that 
mean that the Framers also intended to guarantee a 
right to possess a loaded gun near swimming pools, 
parks, and playgrounds? That they would not have ca-
red about the children who might pick up a loaded gun 
on their parents’ bedside table? That they [...] would 
have lacked concern for the risk of accidental deaths 
or suicides that readily accessible loaded handguns in 
urban areas might bring? Unless we believe that they 
intended future generations to ignore such matters, 
answering questions such as the questions in this case 
requires judgment – judicial judgment exercised within 
a framework for constitutional analysis that guides 
that judgment and which makes its exercise transpa-
rent. One cannot answer those questions by combi-
ning inconclusive historical research with judicial ipse 
dixit (Heller, slip op., p. 43 [Breyer, J., dissenting]).
The need for judgment is precisely what Sca-
lia wishes to avoid. In his world, every careful and honest 
judge should come to the same conclusion because the 
historical facts don’t change, although certainly there might 
be debates about the historical record in some cases.
It is important to note that Scalia’s opinion suc-
cessfully draws the dissenting judges into its gravita-
tional pull, and so the dissenters are equally open to 
criticism. They too look to history, but they do so in a 
manner that appears to provide greater ability to adapt 
the text to modern problems; however, they provide 
no convincing explanation as to why they don’t simply 
operate at a general level of constitutional values and 
adopt the best approach to the problem at hand. If his-
tory is inconclusive, why must it play such a large role 
in their opinions? We might characterize the Heller case, 
then, as a battle between faint-hearted originalists and 
faint-hearted purposivists.10
Lar ry Solum is perhaps the most earnest de-
fender of new originalism’s intellectual integrity in the 
9 For example, in United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2010), the Court determined that a statutory prohibition against the possession of ﬁ rearms by 
persons convicted of the misdemeanor crime of domestic violence should be deemed to ﬁ t with Heller’s non-exhaustive list of “presumptively lawful, longstanding-
prohibition[s]” on gun ownership. The Court engages in no historical inquiry, but rather engages in a very traditional purposivist and analogical analysis to conclude that 
the statute is not unconstitutional (United States v. White, 2010, p. 1205-1206).
10 Sustice Scalia has been criticized for being a “faint-hearted originalist” because he doesn’t follow the historical evidence strictly, but rather softens it with qualiﬁ cations 
fostered by his sense of political, legal, and institutional principles (Barnett, 2006; see also Balkin, 2007: arguing that Justice Scalia is forced to adopt a “faint-hearted 
originalism” because he begins with an overly narrow conception of originalism that would lead to unacceptable results).
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legal academy. We might forgive Justice Scalia for his ugly 
hermeneutics—writing, as he was, under time pressure 
in response to a speciﬁ c case and with the need to hold 
his one-vote majority—but we do, and should, expect 
more from academic commentators. Solum seeks to de-
fend the validity of the Court’s turn to “what has been 
called ‘original public meaning originalism’—the view 
that the original meaning of a constitutional provision 
is the conventional semantic meaning that the words 
and phrases had at the time the provision was framed 
and ratiﬁ ed.”11 Sol um’s phrasing is careful and precise: 
new originalism deﬁ nes the “original meaning” of a text, 
which is not to say that it necessarily deﬁ nes the con-
trolling constitutional rule. Solum separates the argu-
ment about the meaning of the text from the question 
of what role that meaning ought to play in constitutional 
adjudication, acknowledging that precedent, historical 
practice, and other prudential considerations may well 
factor into adjudication after the meaning of the text 
has been determined.12 In  other words, the original 
meaning of a text is a fact in the world that does not, 
without more, resolve the normative question of how 
the Court ought to decide constitutional cases.13
Mor eover, Solum acknowledges that the “origi-
nal meaning” does not exhaust all possible meanings of 
“meaning.”
We can inquire into the linguistic meaning of the 
Constitution: what is the semantic content of the words 
and phrases that comprise the constitutional text? We 
can ask about the applicative meaning of the Constitu-
tion: what are the implications of a given clause for a 
contemporary controversy? We can investigate the te-
leological meaning of the Constitution: what purpose 
was some constitutional provision intended to serve? 
(Solum, 2009, p. 941).
Solum has carefully established that “original 
meaning” should be understood to be a semantic fact 
that is subject to investigation and retrieval. However, 
he has also made clear that original meaning has a con-
tingent relationship to constitutional practice, that re-
solving the character of this relationship is a normative 
matter, and that original meaning does not exhaust the 
full scope of the “meaning” of a text.
If Justice Scalia’s opinion in Heller is to be forgiven 
its theoretical sins because it is a practical exercise of 
authority rather than a genuine scholarly effort, what of 
the academic defense of new originalism by Solum and 
others? Solum properly notes that Heller makes funda-
mental assumptions about the role that the linguistic 
meaning of the constitutional text should play in con-
stitutional practice. These assumptions can be defended 
only if constitutional meaning is to be equated with 
semantic (linguistic) meaning as it is deﬁ ned by Solum. 
But he concedes that there are different ways to de-
termine meaning, and with each of these various forms 
of meaning there are different normative justiﬁ cations 
for a multitude of hermeneutical practices that might be 
pursued. Solum shows his hand by privileging a theoreti-
cal approach to meaning, and on this basis he criticizes 
the dissenting judges in Heller for not being clear about 
the theoretical basis for their reasoning (Solum, 2009, p. 
958). But the ﬁ rst question is whether an academic ef-
fort to fully theorize constitutional practice is practical 
or desirable.
If semantic meaning is a useful concept for speak-
ing precisely about the meaning of texts, it does not fol-
low that this concept answers questions of constitutional 
hermeneutics. The dissenting opinions by Justices Stevens 
and Breyer gesture toward the original understanding of 
the operative terms at issue but their analyses are not con-
ﬁ ned to this understanding of meaning, nor do they estab-
lish a delineated hierarchy for consulting various senses of 
meaning and normative justiﬁ cations in order to reach a 
decision. Justice Scalia relies on what Solum terms, appar-
ently with no sense of irony, the “ﬁ xation thesis,” which is 
the idea that original public meaning is a social fact that 
serves as an unchanging bedrock for semantic meaning (So-
lum, 2009, p; 944-947). But if there is no bedrock that elimi-
nates the challenge of judging—which requires a robust 
consideration of a variety of facts, norms and practices to 
reach a constitutional decision in the case at hand—then 
Stevens and Breyer are not confused and uncertain; they 
simply are judging. And there is nothing in the academic 
defense of new originalism that indicts those who engage 
in prudential judging in complex circumstances, considered 
against the background of a rich and variegated tradition.
11 Solum (2009) provides a succinct, yet rich, overview of the varieties of theories that have marched under the banner of originalism during the past forty years and 
very clearly deﬁ nes the new originalist approach that is at work in Heller to avoid confusions with this intellectual history. 
12 Solum argues that it is no more legitimate for critics to assume that new originalists will look only to original meaning than it is for critics to assume that nonorigi-
nalists will never look to original meaning (Solum, 2009, p.  938-939).
13 Solum explains: What then is the relationship between linguistic facts and normative constitutional theory? The answer to that question is that the relationship is contin-
gent. The linguistic meaning of the Second Amendment might be important for constitutional practice—as the Heller majority thought it was. Or one might believe that 
other considerations are more important [...] The key point is that the inquiry into meaning in the semantic sense is conceptually distinct from the normative inquiry 
about constitutional practice” (Solum, 2009, p.  943-944). And later, “[o]f course, the linguistic meaning of a text may (or may not) constrain the legal effects of the text: 
meaning in the semantic sense can inﬂ uence meaning in the implicative sense” (Solum, 2009, p. 947).
Mootz III  | Ugly American hermeneutics
Revista de Estudos Constitucionais, Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito (RECHTD), 3(1): 42-55                                       49
Moreover, even if one embraces the new origi-
nalist approach, theorists concede that there will be sig-
niﬁ cant indeterminacy in reaching the “correct” result 
in individual cases. The ﬁ xation thesis establishes the 
integrity of semantic meaning (the object of interpre-
tation), but the application of constitutional meaning 
to speciﬁ c cases is admittedly not ﬁ xed but rather the 
“construction” of constitutional meaning. The import of 
this terminology is clear: interpretation is retrieval of a 
preexisting meaning and construction is an active use of 
meaning to fashion a rule for the case at hand. As Solum 
summarizes, there is a temporal as well as a concep-
tual distinction: “We interpret the meaning of a text, and 
then we construct legal rules to help us apply the text to 
particular fact situations” (Solum, 2009, p. 973 [emphasis 
added]). This simplistic understanding not only rejects 
the lessons of contemporary hermeneutical philosophy 
without expressly arguing against them, it also implodes 
the entire new originalist project on its own terms.
Jack Balkin, in what one must assume is an ex-
tended mood of mischief, has entered the debate about 
new originalism by claiming that he accepts new origi-
nalism as a proper theoretical description of interpreta-
tion, but then expanding the scope of construction to 
defend Roe v. Wade as a legitimate decision under new 
originalist principles (Balkin, 2007, p. 427, 449, 522-523). 
If theorists resolutely attend to the original meaning 
of the constitutional text at the time of its enactment, 
Balkin insists, they will ﬁ nd that original meaning origi-
nalism “is actually a form of living constitutionalism” (Id., 
p. 449). This is true because the Constitution is com-
prised of both rules and principles. The original meaning 
of a principle such as “equal protection of the laws” is 
capacious enough to permit judicial elaboration in ac-
cordance with changing social contexts as long as we do 
not limit the principle by construing it in terms of how 
the drafters intended or anticipated that it would be ap-
plied to future cases. Balkin accepts the distinction be-
tween interpretation and construction, but argues that 
judges traditionally have engaged in constitutional con-
struction and so should continue to do so in the course 
of explicating the signiﬁ cance of the original meaning of 
constitutional provisions to particular cases.
The only plausible response to Balkin’s provoca-
tive tack is to look beyond the original meaning of consti-
tutional text in order to secure predictable and desired 
results. And it is precisely for this reason that Justice 
Scalia claims to attend to precedent, historical practice, 
and other experience that might constrain contempo-
rary practice even though these factors admittedly have 
no legitimacy by virtue of the original meaning of con-
stitutional text. Keith Whittington, the political scientist 
most closely associated with promoting new originalism, 
similarly argues that courts should refrain from consti-
tutional construction on democratic grounds, enforcing 
the original meaning of the Constitution as they ﬁ nd 
it, but leaving it to other branches of government to 
construct constitutional doctrine (Whittington, 1999b). 
On the role of democratically responsive actors to en-
gage in constitutional construction, see generally (Whit-
tington, 1999a). The fact that Whittington’s answer to 
Balkin’s reading of new originalism is external to new 
originalist theory brings into sharp focus the fact that 
new originalism is just a theoretically-clariﬁ ed vocabu-
lary for pursuing certain political and legal goals, rather 
than a means of specifying those goals in an objectively 
determinate manner. In short, what Justice Scalia as-
sumes in Heller is nothing less than the justiﬁ cation for 
his decision. 
The triumph of the new textualist methodology 
in Heller is interesting because it occurs in the course 
of constitutional litigation rather than in the self-refer-
ential world of academia. The case shows the power of 
hermeneutical theory, at least at the highest level of the 
judiciary in the hands of a former law professor, making 
clear that new textualism has a very real effect on legal 
practice and strongly inﬂ uences even the dissenters. But 
the stresses of a real case—and particularly the insti-
tutional constraints of the appellate process—conﬁ rm 
that no single theory can deliver a knockout punch that 
eliminates the need for judgment. New textualism is a 
rhetorical means for framing the issue before the court, 
no less and no more helpful than other hermeneutical 
approaches. But when it is deployed with smug self-as-
surance by Justice Scalia as a unitary methodology, new 
textualism subverts judicious reasoning and offers the 
fantasy that the questions have already been decided, 
if only we can discern the historical truth of originalist 
meaning and then reasonably construe the proper ap-
plication to the case at hand.
The more careful scholarly attention to the con-
cepts at work in new originalism makes clear that what 
is at stake is a political decision to pursue a certain con-
ception of law and government, rather than an empirical 
project of uncovering pre-existing law that may then be 
applied. In a sad way, there is not much distance between 
the conﬁ rmation hearings for Justice Sotomayor and the 
articulation of new originalism although the differences 
in the sophistication of the speakers and the audience in 
these two venues lead to apparently different conversa-
tions. The overriding ugliness of American hermeneutics 
is the steadfast ideological commitment to the belief 
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that meaning exists prior to the need to interpret the 
law. From Senator Jeff Sessions, through Justice Anto-
nin Scalia, and on to Professors Solum and Whittington, 
this commitment marks the activity as “American” no 
less than if they all clamored off the cruise ship wearing 
Garth Brooks t-shirts.
In contrast, if there is a single, fundamental prin-
ciple of sophisticated legal hermeneutics as understood 
in many other countries, it surely would be the rejection 
of this very commitment. There is irony in this situation. 
The great civil codes were a product of the Enlighten-
ment era and the desire to clarify and rationalize private 
law, but the intellectual climate in Europe and South 
America has engendered a sophisticated academic ap-
proach to legal hermeneutics. In contrast, the common 
law history in the United States has grown organically as 
part of the rapidly changing social, economic, and politi-
cal environment of the new world, and yet the contem-
porary theoretical self-understanding of this practice is 
increasingly simplistic and reductionist, as if in response 
to the hermeneutical vertigo induced by the practices 
in question.
How can American hermeneutics hope for re-
spect, not to mention emulation, by those who have 
joined modern constitutionalism more recently, if we 
embrace such a retrograde approach to legal prac-
tice? It is as if American technical experts in agricul-
tural production have descended on a South American 
country to explain the freedom-fostering virtues of 
the global capitalist economy in foodstuffs to farmers 
whose lives—political, social, and economic—have been 
wholly controlled by multinational corporations for the 
past century. It is unlikely that disagreement will ensue; 
rather, the likely and deserved response is that the igno-
rance simply will be ignored.
Beauty is only skin deep: looking 
past the ugliness of American 
hermeneutics
If American hermeneutics is ugly, it is not nec-
essarily the case that this results from the fact that it 
is ugly Americans who are interpreting legal texts and 
providing a theoretical defense of that practice. In de-
fense of my countrymen, I suggest that ugly Americans 
cannot so easily be caricatured. There is ugly herme-
neutics at work, to be sure. But, like the ugly American 
in the novel who works on behalf of the local people 
in a straightforward and unassuming manner, Ameri-
can hermeneuts may provide some guidance to world 
scholars by developing their plain-faced pragmatism in 
a manner that is never entirely subordinated to their 
ugly theoretical fantasies. Like the well-meaning couple 
from Kansas who order a meal in Porto Alegre in a loud 
and slow voice because they assume that Portuguese 
speakers will understand English if they just concentrate 
hard enough, American legal scholars tend to be an em-
barrassing group. But, like that Kansas couple, American 
hermeneuts do not live their daily lives in this manner. 
The reality on the ground in Kansas is different from 
the fantasy life in which the couple indulges while on a 
guided tour of Brazilian tourist spots. And, that reality is 
instructive in important ways.
Brian Tamanaha argues that the great theoreti-
cal battle between formalism and realism in American 
jurisprudence has been a ﬁ gment of the collective imag-
ination that ignores the complexities of legal practice 
by employing reductionist accounts (Tamanaha, 2010). 
Formalism was a theoretical development that respond-
ed to the desire to render law into a science beﬁ tting 
university study (Tamanaha, 2010, p. 29-32). But Tama-
naha’s review of the historical evidence leads him to 
conclude that “it is hard to ﬁ nd anyone other than legal 
academics, theorists especially, attesting to these beliefs 
(although academics also expressed skepticism on this), 
while there are plentiful indications that lawyers found 
these claims ill ﬁ tting or absurd” (Tamanaha, 2010, p. 31-
32). The disconnect occurred because academic lawyers 
emphasized the presumed coherence of legal principles 
and the deductive character of reasoning from those 
principles to results in given cases, whereas lawyers and 
judges were enmeshed within an existing and dynamic 
legal system that didn’t approximate such a clean sys-
tem of principles (Tamanaha, 2010, p. 51). Lawyers and 
judges also (and, to some extent, consequently) were 
faced with applying the legal system to speciﬁ c cases in 
situations that could not support deductive reasoning 
(Tamanaha, 2010). Perhaps oversimplifying Tamanaha’s 
careful historical account, we might conclude that the 
theoretical accounts of law that we associate with for-
malism never were accurate with regard to the com-
plexity of legal practice and never were seen as such by 
the participants in legal practice.
Tamanaha demonstrates that the great uprising 
of legal realism in America between the world wars was 
not a dramatic rejection of a formalist ideology that had 
seized the legal imagination as much as a continuation of 
insights into the character of legal practice that had been 
made for decades (Tamanaha, 2010, p. 67). Drawing from 
the path-breaking work of Karl Llewellyn, Tamanaha sug-
gests that we can break the unhelpful caricature of the 
battle between formalists and realists by embracing a 
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14 Tamanaha describes “balanced realism” as follows: “Balanced realism has two integrally conjoined aspects—a skeptical aspect and a rule-bound aspect. It refers to an 
awareness of the ﬂ aws, limitations, and openness of law, an awareness that judges sometimes make choices, that they can manipulate legal rules and precedents, and that they 
sometimes are inﬂ uenced by their political and moral views and their personal biases (the skeptical aspect). Yet it conditions this skeptical awareness with the understanding 
that legal rules nonetheless work; that judges abide by and apply the law; that there are practice-related, social, and institutional factors that constrain judges; and that judges 
render generally predictable decisions consistent with the law (the rule-bound aspect). The rule-bound aspect of judging can function reliably notwithstanding the challenges 
presented by the skepticism-inducing aspect, although this is an achievement that must be earned, is never perfectly achieved, and is never guaranteed” (Tamanaha, 2010, p. 
6). Tamanaha is certainly correct; but, as I describe later in this article, there is much more work to be done in ﬂ eshing out his account of a balanced realism.
15 Pierre Schlag (2009) provides a jurisprudential account of the centrality of the formalism-realism debate to the form of American law, and at this level connects it 
to the current battle between new textualism and purposivism as played out in Heller. Schlag helpfully reminds us that casting off ugly American hermeneutics is not a 
simple matter, although there is room for critical moves against the grip of reigning ideological forms.
16 Llewellyn (2000) challenged the growing belief that preparing students to practice law was inconsistent with the research ideals of the university: “The truth, the truth 
which cries out, is that the good work, the most effective work, of the lawyer in practice roots in and depends on vision, range, depth, balance, and rich humanity—those 
things which it is the function, and frequently the fortune, of the liberal arts to introduce and indeed to induce. The truth is therefore that the best practical training 
a University can give to any lawyer who is not by choice or by unendowment doomed to be hack or shyster—the best practical training, along with the best human 
training, is the study of law, within the professional school itself, as a liberal art” (Llewellyn, 2000, p. 376). Llewellyn also repeated his frequent insistence that law students 
read broadly and deeply to acquaint themselves with the context in which law operates (Llewellyn, 2000, p. 388-389).
17 Llewellyn explains: “There is a theory of advocacy, or spokesmanship, or rhetoric (which aspect lends the name is immaterial)—a theory which has formed the basis 
of a liberal art since classic times; a theory, moreover, which is empty and vain save as it builds on and with deep understanding of the psychological and ethical nature 
of cause or of client, of tribunal or other addressee, of society and of the law-governmental phase thereof” (Llewellyn, 2000, p. 382).
18 Llewellyn (2008, p. 171-172). This is his vision of a legal education in the tradition of the liberal arts: attending to the rhetoric of lawyering in its broadest sense 
(Llewellyn, 2000, p. 389).
“balanced realism” that roots its theoretical inquiry in 
the practice at hand.14 Leg al practice shows us that law 
is Janus-faced: always open to solving unforeseen prob-
lems creatively as well as always rooted in established 
practices that provide certainty. The “false story” of the 
great battle between formalists and realists for the soul 
of the American legal system obscures the degree to 
which each theoretical orientation captures only a part 
of the complex reality of legal practice.15
Tamanaha is correct to identify Llewellyn as a 
central ﬁ gure who resisted the theoretical urge of his 
colleagues and sought a balanced realism. Llewellyn has 
always appeared to many commentators to be a mysteri-
ous charlatan because he rejected the false alternatives 
offered at the height of the realist movement: either law 
is principled and deductive or it is political and indeter-
minate. Llewellyn was re-working the ancient conception 
of law and politics in an effort to overcome the sterile 
academic debates that raged around him. At the end of 
his career, Llewellyn famously called for the study of law 
as a liberal art, grounded in a combination of technical 
proﬁ ciency and broader learning.16 The aim of  Llewellyn’s 
“liberal education” was to develop the rhetorical com-
petence to deal with the situation that Tamanaha names 
“balanced realism.”
In his supplementation of Bramble Bush, Llewellyn 
recognized that the need to bridge the practice-theory 
divide was at the center of his life’s work. He empha-
sized that the craft of law “cries out for the develop-
ment and teaching of its theory, as it does also for study 
by doing in the light of that theory” (Llewellyn, 2008, 
p. 171). He named this needed approach “Spokesman-
ship,” deriving it from the theories ﬁ rst developed in 
ancient Greece as “Rhetoric—in essence: the effective 
techniques of persuasion.”17 Too often,  Llewellyn argued, 
Spokesmanship has been cast too narrowly as no more 
than the ability to add ornament to legal argument as 
part of advocacy.
But “Spokesmanship” has come to be for me a more 
signiﬁ cant focus than any of the above, including and 
proﬁ ting from the essence of each of them while also 
reaching out to cover such matters as the values of 
having buffers between contending principles or the 
differences between the rival goals of victory and 
reconciliation or the problems and obligations of lea-
dership both in the small and in the large. In a word, 
Spokesmanship with special attention to work on the 
legal side seems to me to offer the wherewithal of a 
full-ﬂ edged theoretical-practical discipline with cultu-
ral value equal to its professional value [...].18
Llewellyn regarded Spokesmanship as a rhetori-
cal practice with both theoretical and practical dimen-
sions that can equip lawyers for the challenges of their 
profession.
Llewellyn’s conception of legal rhetoric was cen-
tral to his realist philosophy although many critics badly 
misread him as an ivory-tower relativist who believed 
in law’s absolute indeterminacy. In fact, Llewellyn found 
ample stability within the practice of law while at the 
same time acknowledging room for critique and reform 
(Patterson, 1990, p. 598-599; reviewing Llewellyn, 1989). 
Llewellyn wrote that the totality of the practice of law 
was one of the most “conservative and inﬂ exible” of so-
cial phenomena, and yet every case offered the oppor-
tunity for the judge and lawyers to shift the direction of 
thinking (Llewellyn, 1989). Llewellyn anticipated the cen-
tral tenet of contemporary legal hermeneutics by arguing 
that the meaning of a legal rule is known only in its use, 
and that using a rule always is a reformulation of the rule 
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(either by expansion or contraction) even when the case 
feels like a simple matter of deductive reasoning.
Thus, the task of the judge is to reformulate the rule so 
that from then on the rule undoubtedly includes the 
case or undoubtedly excludes it. “To apply the rule” 
is thus a misnomer; rather, one expands a rule or con-
tracts it. One can only “apply” a rule after ﬁ rst freely 
choosing either to include the instant case within it or 
to exclude the case from it. […]
Matters are no different, only more sharply highlighted, 
when a new case is such that one ﬁ rst must mull over 
whether to include it within an existing category, or must 
choose which existing category to include it in. […]
For we all, lawyer not least, are mistaken about the na-
ture of language. We regard language as if words were 
things with ﬁ xed content. Precisely because we apply to 
a new fact situation a well-known and familiar linguistic 
symbol, we lose the feeling of newness about the case; 
it seems long familiar to us. The word hides its changed 
meaning from the speaker (Llewellyn, 1989, p. 74-75).
His message was philosophically radical, but he 
was no linguistic skeptic, cultural nihilist, or political 
revolutionary. Llewellyn ﬁ rmly believed that lawyers can 
and should be educated to move within the rhetorically-
rich narratives of law that are at once open situations 
and constrained ﬁ elds of meaning.
Tamanaha wonders how legal scholars and political 
scientists could have bought so completely into the false 
story of the great theoretical battle between formalists 
and realists. I would rephrase his question by asking how 
Llewellyn could have been misconstrued and ignored for 
so long. Ugly American hermeneutics is a product of this 
dysfunctional situation, in which theory arises as grossly 
simpliﬁ ed and reductionist accounts in an effort to contain 
a practice that has long been underway without need for 
such theoretical underwriting. The latest skirmish between 
new textualism and purposivism is an ugly distraction from 
serious theoretical and empirical investigation of how 
plain-faced judges and lawyers practice law. In short, ugly 
American hermeneutics conceals the good work of ugly 
(plain, pragmatic) American hermeneuts.
The stultifying effects of new textualism as seen 
from the broader view that I am advancing can best be 
explored in the context of statutory interpretation, 
where the theory ﬁ rst gained resonance. The interpre-
tation of statutes in the United States has a long history 
that is shaped by the English common law legacy and the 
peculiarities of American legal history.19 In the comm on 
law era, English courts viewed statutes as isolated ef-
forts to articulate the principles of the common law, and 
so they construed statutes narrowly against established 
common law doctrines. In the democratic ethos of 
nineteenth-century America, judges were regarded with 
suspicion and accused of undermining legislation with 
their exercise of “equitable interpretation,” but courts 
generally continued to interpret statutes narrowly even 
without a guiding theoretical dogma that the common 
law was supreme. In the twentieth century, judges more 
readily acknowledged the primacy of legislation, but 
they focused on effectuating the purpose of statutes 
rather than pretending that there was a “plain meaning” 
to apply as ministerial and bureaucratic matter. At times 
during this history, there were theoretical claims regard-
ing the proper approach to statutory interpretation, but 
judges generally assumed a partnership with legislatures 
to seek pragmatic solutions by employing an eclectic 
mix of interpretive strategies that acknowledged their 
comparative institutional competencies.20 The relativ ely 
recent focus on securing adjudicative certainty through 
theoretical purity represents a lack of faith in this long 
tradition of what William Popkin has termed “ordinary 
judging” (Popkin, 1999, p. 151-255).
Against the modern efforts of intentionalists, 
textualists, and new textualists to identify the holy grail 
of objective statutory interpretation, Bill Eskridge has 
argued in favor of a “dynamic” approach to statutory 
interpretation that is theoretically rigorous without be-
ing dogmatic or reductionist. Drawing on contempo-
rary philosophical hermeneutics, Eskridge contends that 
judges generally use practical reasoning and a variety 
of interpretive strategies to determine the meaning of 
statute for the case at hand (Eskridge, 1994, p. 55-57; 
Eskridge and Frickey, 1990, p. 321-22). He summarizes, 
with co-author Philip Frickey, how his central theoreti-
cal conclusions arise from the practices involved.
First, statutory interpretation involves creative policy-
making by judges and is not just the Court’s ﬁ guring 
out the answer that was put “in” the statute by the 
enacting legislature. An essential insight of hermeneu-
tics is that interpretation is a dynamic process, and 
that the interpreter is inescapably situated historically. 
[...]
Second, because this creation of statutory mea-
ning is not a mechanical operation, it often involves 
19 The brief historical overview in this paragraph is drawn from Popkin (1999). 
20 Bill Eskridge (2001) persuasively argues in similar fashion that courts used an eclectic blend of text, history, purpose, context, and norms to interpret statutes in the 
early years of the new Republic, underscoring the extent to which theory-driven approaches are a relatively new phenomenon.
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21 “The study of law left me unsatisﬁ ed, because I did not know the aspects of life which it serves. I perceived only the intricate mental juggling with ﬁ ctions that did not 
interest me. What I sought was perception of reality” (Jaspers, 1956, p. 159).
the interpreter’s choice among several competing 
answers. Although the interpreter’s range of choices 
is somewhat constrained by the text, the statute’s 
history, and the circumstances of its application, the 
actual choice will not be “objectively” determinable; 
interpretation will often depend upon political and 
other assumptions held by judges. [...]
Third, when statutory interpreters make these choi-
ces, they are normally not driven by any single value 
[...] The pragmatistic idea that captures this concept 
is the “web of beliefs” metaphor.  [...] [They then ar-
gue that another helpful metaphor is Charles Pierce’s 
contrast of a chain of arguments no stronger than 
the weakest link and a cable woven from various 
threads.] […]
In many cases of statutory interpretation, of course, 
the threads will not all run in the same direction. The 
cable metaphor suggests that in these cases the result 
will depend upon the strongest overall combination of 
threads. […]
Our model holds that an interpreter will look at a 
broad range of evidence—text, historical evidence, 
and the text’s evolution—and thus form a preliminary 
view of the statute. The interpreter then develops that 
preliminary view by testing various possible interpre-
tations against the multiple criteria of ﬁ delity to text, 
historical accuracy, and conformity to contemporary 
circumstances and values. Each criterion is relevant, 
yet none necessarily trumps the others (Eskridge and 
Frickey, 1990, p. 345, 347-348, 351-352).
Eskridge contends that dynamic statutory inter-
pretation is a descriptive account of how judges resolve 
interpretive problems, but also that it is normative to 
the extent that it cautions against unrealistic efforts 
to reduce statutory interpretation to a single valence. 
Courts rarely endorse Eskridge’s dynamic approach 
expressly, but he argues that the great weight of legal 
practice supports the hermeneutic understanding of 
statutory interpretation as practical reasoning.
In an autobiographical essay, Karl Jaspers once 
explained that he rejected a career in law because it 
struck him as an unproductive mental juggling with ﬁ c-
tions, whereas he sought to understand reality.21 The 
current efforts to theorize American law through the 
simplistic bifurcation of “interpretation” and “con-
struction” epitomize the characteristics that Jaspers 
criticized. And this is not a new story in American le-
gal theory. Francis Lieber was one of the most impor-
tant theorists of legal hermeneutics in America in the 
nineteenth century, bringing the romantic and idealist 
traditions of German hermeneutical philosophy to bear 
in the American setting. In Legal and Political Hermeneu-
tics (Lieber, 1839), he argued that preserving the rule of 
law required the identiﬁ cation and clariﬁ cation of the 
“immutable principles and ﬁ xed rules for interpreting 
and construing” the law (Lieber, 1839, p. viii). Adopting 
the intentionalist approach of romantic hermeneutics 
against crude “plain meaning” ideology, Lieber empha-
sized the distinction between interpretation (discover-
ing the speaker’s intended meaning) and construction 
(determining the proper application of the intended 
meaning to the case at hand) in precisely the terms that 
contemporary proponents of new textualism deploy 
these terms.
Lieber’s approach has more nuance and prag-
matism, though, inasmuch as he concluded that the 
art of legal hermeneutics requires both interpretation 
and construction, and that the latter cannot be cabined 
by theoretical limits or methodology (Id., p. 64). Con-
sequently, as Lieber was articulating the philosophical 
bases for intentionalism, his honesty and attention to 
pragmatic considerations simultaneously undermined 
the theoretical utility of intentionalism. If construction 
is inevitable and always premised on judgment, then the 
intended meaning of the text can provide only a veneer 
of determinacy and objectivity for the legal system. De-
ciding when to construe a legal text in a manner that 
departs from its intended meaning is not something that 
is controlled by the text itself, and so Lieber recognized 
that every construction has the potential to undermine 
the rule of law. Because no rule can prevent this excess, 
Lieber’s pragmatic response was simply to caution inter-
preters to be good judges when they constructed the 
legal rule (Lieber, 1839, p. 121-222, 136). One hundred 
and ﬁ fty years later, the same debate ensues with “new 
textualism” replacing “intentionalism,” but with less ac-
knowledgment that the necessity of construction over-
takes efforts to shrink the scope of interpretation to a 
point where it can be determinate. Like the movies in 
the Star Wars franchise, each iteration of mainstream 
American hermeneutical legal theory apparently will be 
worse than the predecessor.
Conclusion
If beauty is only skin-deep, so is ugliness. The re-
demptive features of American hermeneutics are found 
in legal practice, which is never successfully subjugated by 
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the fantastic—in the full sense of that word—accounts 
provided by theorists. Looking past the superﬁ cial theo-
retical dressing, American legal hermeneutics is vibrant 
and sophisticated. Although American hermeneutical 
scholars generally are untutored in, and dismissive of, the 
relevance of Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, or Derrida to 
legal hermeneutics, this situation does not amount to a 
complete embarrassment. Ugly American hermeneutics 
provides a healthy dose of skepticism about the utility 
of embracing sophisticated philosophies simply for the 
sake of the sophistication; Parisian fashion, after all, is not 
designed for everyday wear. The theoretical simplicity of 
American hermeneutics is a bracing corrective to the 
tendencies toward the mystical, baroque, and paranoid 
that often lurk within the European traditions. Ugliness 
has its virtues.
At the same time, there is a possibility of draw-
ing from more sophisticated hermeneutical traditions 
without sacriﬁ cing the pragmatism and practice-ori-
ented perspective that deﬁ nes the American legacy of 
written constitutionalism and common law adjudica-
tion. In my work I have read Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics as radicalizing Heidegger’s fundamental 
ontology by taking a “turn” toward dialogue rather 
than following Heidegger’s “turn” to poetry and the in-
effable language of the Gods (Mootz, 2010, 2006). This 
jurisprudential framework is also used by Bill Eskridge 
in his work on statutory interpretation, and provides a 
sophisticated extension of Francis Lieber’s pathbreak-
ing efforts in the early years of the American Republic. 
There is no need to choose between plain-faced prag-
matic practices and sophisticated theorizing. Rooting 
sophisticated hermeneutical theory in the practices at 
hand is itself a hermeneutical theory, and it is precisely 
at this juncture that the conversation between schol-
ars from Brazil and the United States might be most 
productive.
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